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JOHN ROBINSON 
Windham College
Anaximander and the Problem of 
the Earth’s Immobility*
IN the course of his review of the reasons given by his predecessors for the earth’s immobility, Aristotle states that “some” attribute it neither to the action of the whirl nor to the air beneath’s hindering 
its falling :
These are the causes with which most thinkers busy themselves.
But there are some who say, like Anaximander among the ancients, 
that it stays where it is because of its “indifference” (όμοιότητα).
For what is stationed at the center, and is equably related to the 
extremes, has no reason to go one way rather than another—either 
up or down or sideways. And since it is impossible for it to move 
simultaneously in opposite directions, it necessarily stays where 
it is.1
The ascription of this curious view to Anaximander appears to have 
occasioned little uneasiness among modern commentators. On the con­
trary, it has been accepted—quite justly, if it is to be accepted at all— 
as evidence for the early abandonment in Greek thought of the notion 
of an absolute up and down.2 The only commentator, so far as I know, 
to reject outright Aristotle’s ascription of this view to Anaximander is 
W. A. Heidel, who never developed at any length his reasons for doing 
so.3 Nevertheless Heidel seems to be entirely in the right, and I propose 
to provide in this paper what I hope will be more solid grounds for 
rejecting the explicit testimony of Aristotle.
Let us begin by seeing what the passage asserts. It formulates the 
general principle that a body will stay put if two conditions are fulfilled : 
first, that it is “stationed at the center” of whatever contains it, and 
second, that it is “equably related to the extremes” of that container. 
A body in this state is δμοιοί. It is further implied that the earth is a 
body that fulfills these conditions, and that this is the reason why it does 
not move out of its place.
* Presented at the 1953 meeting of the SAGP in Rochester, New York.
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The meaning of the first condition seems clear enough. If the earth 
is the body in question, and what contains it is the ουρανός, then “ to be 
stationed at the center” will mean “to be equidistant from every point 
on the circumference of the ουρανός.” The second condition is fulfilled 
when the earth is “equably related to the extremes” of the ουρανός, but 
we are not told in what respect it must be equably related to them. For 
further light on this point we must turn to the account of the matter 
given by Hippolytus, who is drawing on what may be supposed to be 
Theophrastus’ version of our passage. According to this account, 
Anaximander held that the earth is suspended in mid-air “by reason of 
its equidistance from all things (διά τήν όμοίαν πάντων άπόστασιν).”4 It is 
difficult to see what “all things” can refer to unless to all points on the 
circumference of the ουρανός ; otherwise the explanation would entirely 
lack plausibility. On the other hand, if this is all that the passage asserts, 
it is evident that the second condition adds nothing to the first. All that is 
necessary is that the earth be located at the center.
Now, what was the immediate source upon which Aristotle was 
drawing for the formulation of this view? It is, I think, evident that he 
was drawing upon certain passages in the Phaedo and in the Timaeus in 
which we find Plato putting forward a very similar view. The evidence 
for this is clear enough from aii examination of the language of the 
passage in the De Cáelo, the similarity of which to the language of the 
dialogues has not failed to catch the attention of commentators.5 But the 
similarity is not merely verbal. In the Phaedo once more we have the 
earth’s immobility offered as a particular case of a general principle, 
namely that “a thing which is in equilibrium and placed in the center of 
something homogeneous (όμο(ου) will not incline in one direction rather 
than another, but being equable (όμοίως δ’ 2χον) will remain steady 
(άκλινές).”® The earth, being spherical, is in equilibrium; and, being 
placed at the center of the ούρανός, which is uniform, it does not move in 
any direction.
But it is not quite clear what is meant by the “uniformity of the 
heavens” (όμοιότητα του ούρανοΟ). As Burnet has pointed out, όμοιότης 
cannot refer to homogeneity of substance or density, for the world is not 
homogeneous in substance.7 But if this is so, the word must refer to the 
space itself which is taken up by the ούρανός, and by the “uniformity of 
the heavens” will be meant, then, merely its equidistance in every direc­
tion from the earth taken as a center. To say this, however, is simply to 
repeat in another form what has already been stated, namely that the 
earth is situated in the center. As we have seen, Aristotle preserves this
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redundancy by saying that the earth must not only be located at the center 
but must also be equably related to the extremes. It is unnecessary, I 
think, to labor this point further, for a number of modern commen­
tators have already expressed either openly or by implication their 
belief that Plato is the immediate source of Aristotle’s formulation of the 
view he attributes to Anaximander.
That Aristotle drew his formulation of the view from Plato does 
not, of course, prove that the view itself was not held by Anaximander. 
But neither is there any indication, either in the Phaedo or the Timaeus, 
that Plato drew his account from Anaximander. Aristotle is our solé 
evidence for the existence of the view prior to Plato. Hippolytus, of 
course, ascribes the view in question to Anaximander ; and Aëtius, in a 
passage we shall deal with presently, ascribes a similar view to Parmen­
ides and Democritus. But it is almost certain that they do not speak 
from first-hand knowledge, and that their information comes from 
Theophrastus, and so ultimately from Aristotle. The passage in the De 
Cáelo, then, which is before us, constitutes the only direct evidence we 
have for the belief that Anaximander dealt with the problem of the 
earth’s immobility in this way.
We may now turn to the evidence against Anaximander’s having 
held the view imputed to him by Aristotle—evidence supplied in large 
measure by Aristotle himself in other passages in the De Cáelo.
A little consideration will show that this theory of the earth’s 
immobility is founded upon the supposition that the earth has no abso­
lute weight, that is, that it has no natural tendency to fall. According to 
Aristotle, the earth, because of its equidistancë from the extremes, will 
move neither sideways nor up or down. The possibility of the earth’s 
moving upward we may ignore ; this does not appear to have presented 
itself as a problem to any of the Presocratics. But the possibility of its 
falling down presented them with a very acute one; for these thinkers, 
unlike Plato, thought of the earth as having weight, and therefore as 
requiring some sort of support. Aristotle himself is evidence for the pre­
occupation of earlier thinkers with this problem, and it is clear from his 
account that most of them supposed the earth to be supported by air :
Anaximenes, Anaxagoras and Democritus say that the flatness of 
the earth is the cause of its staying where it is; for it does not cut 
the air beneath it but covers it like a lid. This seems to be the way 
of flat-shaped bodies ; it is difficult even for the wind to move them 
because of their power of resistance. The same immobility, they 
say, is produced by the flatness of the surface which the earth 
presents to the air which lies beneath it.8
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Similar statements in the doxographers and even in the medical writers 
attest to the presence of a single tradition in early cosmology : the belief 
that the earth is absolutely heavy and requires support.
The only apparent exception to this view (aside, of course, from the 
passage in the De Cáelo whose accuracy is in dispute) appears in a state­
ment by Aëtius: “Parmenides and Democritus say that the earth, being 
equidistant in every direction, remains in equilibrium, having no reason 
to fall one way rather than another; hence though it quakes it does not 
move.”9 The idea is the same as that expressed in the report' of Aristotle : 
the earth, being equidistant in every direction from the ουρανός, remains 
balanced. Being no more inclined to move one way than another, it does 
not move at all.
Now we know to start with that this report is quite false so far as it 
concerns Democritus, for we know that Democritus regarded the earth 
as flat, and we know from Aristotle’s own account that those thinkers who 
held the earth to be flat did so because the immobility of the earth— 
specifically its failure to fall—necessarily involved its being flat.10 That 
is, it is only on the basis of its being flat that we can account for the earth’s 
staying up by riding upon the air. But why need the problem of the 
earth’s support arise at all unless it is because the earth is thought of as 
absolutely heavy? And if the earth is heavy, then clearly there is a reason 
for Democritus why the earth should fall one way (i.e., down) rather 
than another, and Aëtius’· report must be erroneous.
Whether Aëtius correctly attributes this view to Parmenides is. 
more difficult to decide because of the slightness of our knowledge of 
the details of Parmenides’ cosmology. Nevertheless, we have enough 
information to allow us to draw conclusions that are highly probable, 
and these make it unlikely that Aëtius’ report can be trusted.
What is important for our purposes, as the above consideration of 
Democritus has shown, is the shape of the earth in Parmenides’ cos­
mology. We have two pieces of evidence bearing on this, both of which 
come from Diogenes Laertius. In his life of Parmenides, Diogenes states 
that “he was the first to represent the earth as spherical (σφαιροειδή) and 
as situated in the middle.”11 But elsewhere he gives a rather different 
account. We are told, he says, that Pythagoras was “the first to call the 
heavens a cosmos and to describe the earth as στρογγύλη ; but Theo­
phrastus says that Parmenides was the first to do this.”12 The first of 
these statements is of little value. Diogenes uses the same word, 
σφαιροειδή, to describe the earth of Anaximander, which we know to have 
been flat.13 Moreover, the assertion that Parmenides was the first to
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place the earth in the center is contrary to all the evidence. Of more 
importance is the second account, which comes from Theophrastus and 
implies that Parmenides himself used the word στρογγύλη to describe 
the shape of the earth. The majority of the commentators take στρογγύλη 
to mean, here, “spherical” as opposed to “flat” (πλατεία)— apparently 
on the ground that the words στρογγύλη and πλατεία are used as anto­
nyms in the PhaedoM But passages from other authors might be cited 
to the contrary. The author of the “Hippocratic” treatise Head Wounds, 
for example, writing toward the end of the fifth century, distinguishes 
between weapons that are στρογγυλά and weapons which are περιφερέα, 
though περιφερή* is the word which Plato himself uses in the Phaedo to 
describe the spherical earth.15 “ It is certain,” as Heidel has pointed out, 
“that in the fifth century the term in question was not used exclusively 
or even generally with reference to a sphere.”16 On the other hand, it is 
frequently used in connection with a cylindrical shape.17 Hippolytus, 
for example, describes the earth of Anaximander as στρογγυλόν, κίονι λίθω 
παραπλήσιον : “ round, like a stone column.”18 The word is used again to 
describe the earth of Diogenes of Apollonia, which was almost certainly 
disk-shaped.19 Thus in both cases where the term is used to describe 
the shape of the earth in connection with earlier thinkers it has the same 
meaning. There is no reason to suppose that it had a different meaning 
as applied to the earth of Parmenides. On the contrary, the fact that 
Parmenides uses σφαίρα to describe the sphere of being and στρογγύλη 
to describe the earth suggests prima facie that he distinguished between 
the use of the two words. The likelihood that Parmenides did treat the 
earth as a flat disk is increased by Aëtius’ description of the earth as the 
midmost of a series of concentric rings, unique only in being solid—a 
way of speaking that strongly suggests that it is shaped like a disk.20 If 
this is true, then there is good reason to believe, arguing upon the lines 
pursued above in connection with Democritus, that Parmenides re­
garded the earth as heavy ; and this is confirmed by the statement of 
Pseudo-Plutarch that “the earth arises from the sinking down of the 
dense”—the “ dense” being the heavier part of the original mixture.21 
But if Parmenides thought of the earth as heavy, it is clear that he could 
not have supposed, any more than Democritus, that there is no reason 
for the earth to move one way (i.e., downwards) rather than another.
I have been at pains to establish the fact that all our evidence points 
to the existence of a single tradition among the earliest thinkers, one 
presupposing that the earth has absolute weight, and accounting for its 
support by imagining it to be flat. That Anaximander belonged to this
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tradition is not difficult to establish ; indeed had he departed from it in 
the manner imputed to him by Aristotle, the failure of succeeding think­
ers to comment upon the fact would be completely inexplicable. We 
know that before Anaximander Thales thought of the earth as heavy, 
for he felt obliged to explain its staying up by supposing that it floated 
upon water.22 That Anaximander followed him in thinking of it as heavy 
is evident from the fact that in accounting for the disposition of the parts 
of the cosmos he makes use of the same process of separation (εκκρισι?, 
άττόκρισι$) which subsequent thinkers make use of in accounting for the 
coming together of the heavier elements at the center and the lighter at 
the periphery.23 It was for this reason that, like Thales before him, he 
was faced with the problem of the earth’s support—a problem which he 
was obliged to solve (following the line of thought so succinctly indi­
cated by Aristotle himself) by conceiving it as a flat disk, a cylinder 
having a depth one-third its breadth.
On the basis of this evidence I hold that the view imputed to 
Anaximander by Aristotle not only was not but could not have been held 
by him. Simplicius, aware of the impossibility of fastening such a view 
upon Anaximander, departs so far from Aristotle as to say that Anaxi­
mander attributed the immobility of the earth “both to the air’s holding 
it up and its equilibrium and ‘indifference.’ ”24 Consider for a moment 
the significance of this statement. We have in it the first suggestion that 
the problem of the earth’s immobility is not a simple but a complex 
problem. On the one hand there is the problem of the earth’s support— 
of explaining why it does not fall ; on the other there is the problem of 
the earth’s lateral fixity—of explaining why it is that the earth does not 
move to one side or another. Much of the confusion in Aristotle’s dis­
cussion in the De Cáelo springs from the fact that he fails to realize 
that these are two entirely different problems. For example, in the 
midst of a discussion of why the earth does not fall, he ascribes to 
Empedocles the view that “ it is the swiftness of the motion of the heaven 
as it swings around in a circle that prevents the earth from moving.”25 
He is speaking here of those thinkers who attribute the earth’s position 
at the center to the vortex (δίνη); “for all of them say that this is the 
cause, arguing from what happens in liquids and in air, where the larger 
and heavier things always travel to the center of a vortex. Hence all who 
hold that the heaven came into being say that the earth travelled to the 
center for this reason.”2® Now it is evident from this context that 
Empedocles can only have meant to explain in this way why it is that the 
earth does not move sideways, i. e., in the plane of the whirl. Being heavy,
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it is carried to the center and held there by centripetal force. But the 
whirl does not prevent the earth from falling, and Empedocles recog­
nizing this, supplied an additional cause for its being held aloft by 
supposing, with his predecessors, that it is flat.27 Aristotle mistakenly 
thinks of Empedocles as representing a tradition other than that repre­
sented by Anaximenes, Anaxagoras and Democritus, regarding the cause 
of the earth’s immobility, because he fails entirely to see that for earlier 
thinkers there were two problems involved : one of explaining why it does 
not move sideways, and quite another of explaining why it does not fall.
We have seen that earlier thinkers met the latter problem by imagin­
ing the earth to be supported from below, either by water (in Thales’ 
case) or by air ; and we have seen that according to Aristotle himself all 
of them accounted for the earth’s lateral fixity by making use of the 
whirl as a principle of explanation sufficient not only for the original 
separating-out of the light from the heavy but also of the continuing 
maintenance of this separation. In the fragmentary accounts which we 
have of Anaximander’s thought there is ample evidence of his having 
made the same sort of use of the whirl as a principle of explanation as 
we find in later thinkers.28 We have, therefore, to regard with equal 
suspicion Aristotle’s account of Anaximander’s views even with regard 
to the problem of the earth’s lateral fixity.
At the same time it is perhaps a little easier to see how Aristotle 
could have come to the mistaken conclusion that Anaximander held the 
view ascribed to him in the De Cáelo. An earth held in the grip of the 
vortex would in fact be in a condition of Ισορροπία or όμοιότης uvas much 
as it would be driven in upon the center with equal force from all sides ; 
and it would be equidistant from all points on the periphery of the vortex 
for the same reason. A poetically worded reference to this state of affairs 
could very easily have been misconstrued by Aristotle as a causal 
account of the earth’s immobility.29 Whether this is what happened 
we have, of course, no way of knowing; but it seems to me clearly 
impossible in the face of the available evidence to take seriously Aris­
totle’s ascription of the view of the Phaedo and the Timaeus to Anaxi­
mander.
NOTES
1 Aristotle De Cáelo II. 1,3, 295b 10 ff. I have followed Stocks and 
Burnet in rendering όμοιότη; as “indifference.” The word suggests better 
than “likeness” or “similarity” the dynamic aspect of the situation.
2 See most recently Charles H. Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of 
Greek Cosmology (Ñew York, i960), pp. 76 ff. I have discussed Kahn’s
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acceptance of Aristotle’s testimony in a review article, “The Framework of 
Greek Cosmology,” RM, XIV (1961): 676-84.
3 W. A. Heidel, “The δίνη in Anaximenes and Anaximander,” CP, I 
(1906): 279-82; see also The Frame of the Ancient Greek Maps (New York, 
1937). PP· 68-69.
4 Hippolytus, Ref. i.6 .3 (DK 12 A 11).
5 See, for example, Stocks’ note on De Cáelo IL 13, 295b 12 in the 
Oxford translation. Stocks rightly points out that although Aristotle borrows 
the language of the Phaedo his understanding of it was faulty.
6 Plato Phaedo 108E-109A. Cp. Timaeus 62D-63A.
7 John Burnet, Plato’s Phaedo (Oxford, 1911), note on Phaedo 109A6.
8 Aristotle De Cáelo II. 13, 294b 13 ff.
9 Aëtius iii. 15. 7 (DK 28 A 44).
10 Aëtius iii. 10. 5 (DK 68 A 94) and Aristotle De Cáelo II. 13, 294a 9 ff.
11 Diogenes Laertius ix. 21 (DK 28 A 1).
12 Diogenes Laertius viii. 48 (DK 28 A 44).
13 Diogenes Laertius ii. 1 (DK 12 A 1). Cp. [Plut.] Strom. 2 (DK 12 
A 10) and Hippolytus Ref. i. 6. 3 (DK 12 A 11).
14 Plato, Phaedo 97D.
15 On Head Wounds iii. 24 Withington. Plato, Phaedo 108E. For the 
date of Head Wounds, see Withington in the Loeb Hippocrates iii, xxv.
16 W. A. Heidel, The Frame of the Ancient Greek Maps (New York, 
1937). P· 74·
17 Theophrastus, for example, in his History of Plants (v. 6. 5) des­
cribes unsquared logs as ξύλα στρογγυλά. In another place (History of Plants 
vii. 4. 5) he speaks of a certain plant as στρογγυλόκαυλον: “having a round 
stalk.” In both cases the reference is to something cylindrical.
18 Hippolytus Ref. i. 6. 3 (DK 12 A 11).
19 Diogenes Laertius ix. 57 (DK 64 A 1). Cp. John Burnet, Early 
Greek Philosophy (London, 1930), p. 337.
29 Aëtius ii. 7. i (DK 28 A 37).
21 [Plut.] Strom. 5 (DK 28 A 22).
22 Aristotle De Cáelo IL 13, 294a 28.
23 As W. A. Heidel observes [“The δίνη in Anaximenes and Anaxi­
mander,” CP, I (1906), 281] “the whole range of Greek philosophy connects 
άττόκρισίξ and εκκρισίζ with the δίνη.”
24 Simplicius De Cáelo, 531-32.
25 Aristotle De Cáelo IL· 13, 295a 17.
26 Aristotle De Cáelo IL 13, 295b 10 ff.
27 So much is clear from Aëtius ii. 8. 2 (DK 31 A 58). The “tilting” 
referred to here and in connection with other thinkers (e.g., Aëtius iii. 12. 2 
[DK 68 A 96] for Democritus) implies a flat earth.
28 For the rôle of the δίνη in the thought of Anaximander and his 
successors I would refer the reader to my Introduction to Early Greek 
Philosophy (Boston, 1968), Index, s.v. “Vortex.”
29 That Anaximander expressed himself in “somewhat poetical lan­
guage” we know from Simplicius Phys. 24. 18 (DK 12 B x).
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